Case analysis · Litigation & decisions
Cahaly v. LaRosa: The Fourth Circuit Strikes Down South Carolina's Robocall Ban on Free Speech Grounds
State legislatures love writing their own robocall rules. But a state law that picks and chooses which robocalls to ban based on what they say can run straight into the First Amendment. That's what happened in Cahaly v. LaRosa, 796 F.3d 399 (4th Cir. 2015), where the Fourth Circuit held that South Carolina's anti-robocall statute was a content-based speech restriction that could not survive strict scrutiny.
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Judge Diaz wrote the opinion for a unanimous panel.
The Statute
South Carolina's 1991 law regulated "automatically dialed announcing device" calls, better known as robocalls. It banned only robocalls made for the purpose of an unsolicited consumer telephone call or of a political nature, including calls relating to political campaigns. Robocalls on any other subject were untouched. There were three consent-based exceptions to the ban, including calls at the express request of the person called. Violations were misdemeanors.
The Arrest
In 2010, a political consultant allegedly placed prerecorded "one-question survey" calls in six state house districts, asking voters about the incumbents. About a week earlier, a lawyer in the state Attorney General's office had told him the statute didn't cover automated political survey polls, and a written opinion letter followed. After candidates complained, a state magistrate issued six arrest warrants. The charges were dismissed eighteen months later.
He sued state law enforcement officials, seeking a declaration that the statute was unconstitutional plus damages for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The district court declared the law unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement.
Content Based, Full Stop
Applying the Supreme Court's then-new framework in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the Fourth Circuit held the statute content based on its face because it applied to calls with a consumer or political message but not to calls made for any other purpose. Under Reed, the government's purpose didn't matter at that first step.
So strict scrutiny applied. Even assuming protecting residential privacy is a compelling interest, the state failed to show the law was narrowly tailored. The court pointed to less restrictive alternatives: time-of-day limits, mandatory caller identity disclosure, and do-not-call lists. The state offered no evidence those wouldn't work.
The statute was also overinclusive, since a congressional committee report cited by the defendants found unwanted commercial calls a far bigger problem than political or charitable ones. And it was underinclusive, allowing unlimited robocalls on every other topic.
The Rest of the Case
- Compelled speech: The consultant lacked standing to challenge the disclosure provision, because it applied only to permitted calls and he never said he planned to make any. That ruling was vacated with instructions to dismiss.
- Vagueness: No standing, because his calls were "of a political nature," which the statute clearly covered.
- Damages: Probable cause supported the arrest, since officers can rely on reasonable mistakes of law and no precedent had yet held the statute unconstitutional. The officials retained qualified immunity, and the state law claims failed.
Why It Matters
- State robocall laws face real First Amendment limits. Singling out certain message categories invites strict scrutiny.
- Tailoring is the battleground. Courts may ask why time limits, disclosures, or do-not-call lists aren't enough.
- Winning on the statute doesn't guarantee damages. Officers who enforce a law later struck down may still be protected.
Read the Fourth Circuit opinion.
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