McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp. (2025)

The short version

In a private lawsuit or other enforcement proceeding under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), a federal district court is not bound by the Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) interpretation of the statute. The district court must decide what the TCPA means for itself, using ordinary principles of statutory interpretation, while "affording appropriate respect" to the FCC's interpretation.

Background

The TCPA prohibits sending unsolicited fax advertisements to a "telephone facsimile machine" without a required opt-out notice. It gives recipients a private right of action with statutory damages of $500 per violation.

McKesson Corporation, a healthcare company, sent fax advertisements through a subsidiary in 2009 and 2010. McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates sued in 2014 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California and sought to represent a class of recipients, some of whom received the faxes on traditional fax machines and some through online fax services.

While the case was pending, the FCC issued its Amerifactors order, which construed "telephone facsimile machine" so as to exclude online fax services. Under Ninth Circuit precedent, the district court treated that order as binding because of the Hobbs Act, the 1950 law that channels pre-enforcement challenges to FCC final orders to the federal courts of appeals. The court granted summary judgment to McKesson on the online-fax claims and decertified the class, which left McLaughlin with claims for 12 faxes and $6,000 in damages. The Ninth Circuit affirmed.

What the Court decided

The Court reversed and remanded. Justice Kavanaugh wrote for a six-justice majority. Justice Kagan dissented, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson.

The majority ruled that the Hobbs Act governs how a party can bring a pre-enforcement challenge to an FCC order. It does not stop a district court in a later enforcement proceeding, such as a private TCPA suit, from deciding for itself whether the agency's reading of the statute is correct. The Court cited its 2024 decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo in describing the respect a court should give an agency's interpretation.

The Court did not decide whether the FCC's reading of "telephone facsimile machine" is right. It left that question for the lower courts on remand.

Why it matters

• FCC interpretations are persuasive, not controlling, in TCPA lawsuits. For decades, many courts treated FCC orders interpreting the TCPA as binding in private cases. After McLaughlin, parties can ask a district court to read the statute differently from the FCC.
• Old questions are open again. Issues that courts once considered settled by FCC orders, such as whether text messages count as "calls" for every part of the statute, can now be argued from the statutory text. For example, in Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, No. 25-2398 (7th Cir. 2026), the Seventh Circuit held that the private right of action in § 227(c)(5), which refers to "telephone calls," does not let plaintiffs sue over unwanted text messages, and cited McLaughlin in explaining that it was not bound by the FCC's view. Other circuits may reach different conclusions.
• More variation between courts. Because each court reads the statute itself, results may differ by circuit until appellate courts or the Supreme Court resolve particular questions.