Case analysis · Litigation & decisions
Bradley v. DentalPlans.com: District of Maryland Rejects the Written Consent Rule and Decertifies a Winback Call Class
In Bradley v. DentalPlans.com, No. 20-1094-BAH (D. Md. Mar. 20, 2026), the court granted reconsideration of its 2024 class certification and summary judgment rulings. Applying Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), and McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. 146 (2025), it held that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) requires only "prior express consent" for prerecorded calls, not the "prior express written consent" that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) requires for telemarketing. It then entered judgment for the seller on the named plaintiff's claim and decertified the class.
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Background
The plaintiff enrolled by phone in a dental discount plan in 2018. The representative, following a script, asked whether she consented to contact by an automatic dialing system or prerecorded message. When she asked why, the representative said "to keep you updated with any plan information" and confirmed only the seller would call. She agreed.
When she declined to renew, she was sent ten prerecorded "winback" calls urging her to repurchase. The seller estimated that it placed such calls to 57,240 former customers.
In June 2024, the court treated the calls as telemarketing requiring written consent, found a factual dispute about consent and certified a class. The Fourth Circuit denied permission for an interlocutory appeal.
The Court's Analysis
Framework. Courts have to independently decide statutory meaning, giving the agency appropriate respect. Following the guidance of the Fourth Circuit, the court asked whether Congress specifically delegated interpretive authority over "prior express consent."
No such delegation. The court found persuasive Insurance Marketing Coalition Ltd. v. FCC, 127 F.4th 303 (11th Cir. 2025), and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Bradford v. Sovereign Pest Control of TX, Inc., No. 24-20379 (5th Cir. Feb. 25, 2026). Authority to "implement" Section 227(b) did not permit adding a writing requirement. Section 227(c), which concerns Do Not Call protections, supplied no more authority. The Do-Not-Call Implementation Act's directive to coordinate with the Federal Trade Commission did not delegate power to rewrite the statute. The court also declined Skidmore weight, noting that the writing requirement arrived in 2012, two decades after enactment.
Consent given. Using the 1990 Black's Law Dictionary definition of express consent, "directly given, either viva voce or in writing," the court held that the plaintiff expressly agreed to autodialed or prerecorded calls. The plaintiff argued her consent did not extend to telemarketing. The court found no basis in the statute for distinguishing telemarketing from informational robocalls; Congress distinguished calls by how they are made, not their content.
Decertification. Because the named plaintiff's claim had failed, certification of the class was no longer appropriate. The court requested a status report on the remaining vicarious liability claim against the plan's insurer, noting it was "suspect."
Observations
This is a significant post-Loper Bright district court ruling on consent. It removes the written consent requirement as a basis for private robocall liability in this case and reads the scope of oral consent broadly.
Caution is warranted. The Fourth Circuit has not ruled on the question, other courts may disagree and the FCC regulation remains on the books. The court also flagged, without deciding, possible reconsideration of vicarious liability under the TCPA.
This article provides general information and is not legal advice.
The District of Maryland's memorandum opinion in Bradley v. DentalPlans.com is attached.
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